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The Grenadian revolution has been widely canvassed
as the most important achievement of the left in the
English-speaking Caribbean. Regionally, its impor-
tance has been dwarfed only by the Cuban revolution
and the Sandinistas' struggles in Nicaragua. It is
therefore of great importance to analyse the impact of
its collapse in October 1983 on the 'popular forces' of
the English-speaking Caribbean. By 'popular forces' I
refer to the broad constituency of people who are
opposed to colonisation and neo-colonial forms of
metropolitan domination of the region; to its
involvement in international rivalries; to the per-
petuation of poverty and vast domestic inequalities in
the distribution of income, wealth, jobs and power;
and to the systematic suppression of human rights and
the effective exclusion of the broad masses of the
region's population from the major say in the
governance of their lives. Some of this constituency is
organised into left-wing political parties, but by no
means all of it is, and it is compatible with a
multiplicity of party organisations.
To evaluate the events in Grenada from this perspective
it is useful to distinguish between the execution and
assassination of Bishop, his allies in the government
and others, and the invasion by the Organisation of
the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the USA.
While these two aspects are closely linked, the former
set of events is unique in our historical experience,
whereas US invasion (albeit this time in alliance with
the OECS states) is commonplace. It is said that US
administrations have ordered the invasion of other
countries more than 100 times in the past 100 years,
and in the Western hemisphere alone it has done so
more than 60 times this century. Given the frequency
of these invasions, we should perhaps have come to
expect them, even if we do not accept them! What we
certainly have not come to expect, and hopefully will
never accept, is that the execution of Bishop and his
colleagues belongs to any tradition of any section of
the popular forces of the region. To anticipate the
analysis which follows, I would venture to say that had
the invasion not occurred, the Grenadian revolution
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- with all its positive gains - had self-destructed with
the execution of Bishop, and because of this, would
have had no continued legitimacy among the broad
mass of the Caribbean peoples. In a perverse way,
because the invasion took place after the revolution
had already destroyed itself, it resulted in breathing
new life into the corpse.
The Paralysis of Regional Integration
It is useful to begin by recalling the main lines of
development of the regional integration movement
just prior to these events, using these as an index of
regional political consciousness.
After a long period of dormancy, when the highest
decision-making authority of the regional integration
movement, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Heads of Government Conference, could not be
convened, two Heads of Government Conferences
were held in a period of eight months, in November
1982 and June 1983. Following these meetings the
pronouncements made by the various governments
were very optimistic about the future of the regional
movement. These included Grenada, whose full
incorporation into the CARICOM fold then seemed
beyond question.
The concerns of the smaller states of CARICOM,
which had always plagued the integratioh movement,
were placed high on the regional agenda, and the
institutionalisation of the grouping into the OECS in
1981 marked a major advance in addressing the plight
of the small states. Grenada had played a leading part
in this development - once again confirming the
increasing acceptance of their revolutionary process
into the regional outlook.
While the impact of national and international
developments was taking a severe toll on the economic
arrangements of CARICOM in several areas - e.g.
the collapse of the regional currency settlement and
clearing facility (CMCF), the rise in protectionism and
a growing tendency towards intraregional trade and
exchange rate conflicts - at a regional level adherence
to strategies of greater local and regional control of
resources, decision-making in economic affairs,
technology, skills and so on was growing. This
development was accompanied by many public
pronouncements of an anti-imperialist nature by
governments, as well as by trade unions, churches, and
human rights and social organisations. Examples of
these are pointedly sceptical remarks about, and
criticisms of, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),
and its hidden designs aimed at 're-colonisation of the
region'; strongly critical statements about the
European Community and its handling of the EEC-
ACP economic arrangements; and forceful support in
international fora for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO), along with calls for greater South-
South cooperation as a counter to domination by the
North. These attitudes were also reflected in a more
favourable disposition by all the major institutions of
the popular forces towards the non-aligned movement.
iv) In the field of international relations (and of the
greatest political significance regionally) the idea that
the Caribbean should be declared a 'zone of peace'
gained wider acceptance. While the Caribbean
Conference of Churches had played a leading role in
the development of this idea, many other non-
governmental organisations and some governments
and ruling parties had also declared their adherence to
it. In the context of escalated US warfare in the region
and the Reagan administration's aggressive re-
assertion of a 'right' to dictate the political
complexions of governments 'in its own backyard',
this marked the development of an important anti-
imperialist consensus.
y) Within the region generally, and particularly at
governmental levels, there was a concerted move
towards an acceptance of 'political pluralism' as a
feature of the integration movement. While important
sections of the popular forces wanted this linked to an
insistence on minimal standards of political culture,
such as representative governments, and a positive
environment for the development of human rights,
both Burnham's brand of dictatorship (which he
called 'socialism' in Guyana, but which they
considered repugnant) and the Grenadian revolu-
tionary process were accepted as being the 'internal
concerns' of the countries themselves, and not an issue
to be deliberated upon by a regional intergovernmental
organisation. (This also represented a reversal of the
initial inability of heads of government to accept the
overthrow of Gairy, which had been one of the factors
that had for a long time prevented the convening of the
Heads of Government Conference.)
While these developments were certainly uneven both
among and within the territories concerned, there can
be little doubt that a progressive, liberal, anti-
imperialist and nationalist consciousness had come to
constitute the hegemonic tendency in regional
opinion. This did not, of course, take place overnight.
It was the end result of a long series of conflicts
between the popular forces and the colonial
consciousness which had been built up within the
region through centuries of colonial domination; and
later, after World War II, between the ideas of the
popular forces and the hysterical anti-communist,
anti-socialist, and anti-Cuban opinion emanating, in
particular, from the ruling circles of the USA - ideas
which the dominant classes in the Caribbean sought to
establish in place of the colonial outlook. Naturally,
the success of the nationalist-progressive ideas
depended upon, and in turn supported, the
increasingly favourable national, regional and inter-
national context of working-class and peasant
struggles after World War II, and the growth of
indigenously educated classes which followed the
establishment of a local and regional higher education
system.
My first major proposition is, then, that the trauma of
the executions in Grenada, as a method of settlement
of political issues on the left, shattered the
advantageous position held by the body of opinion,
theories and ideas which support the interests of the
popular forces in the Caribbean. This defeat was
critical, for without the growth and consolidation of
the hegemonic position of progressive/liberal/nation-
alist opinion in the region, the organisational and
ideological growth of the left will always be stunted.
Without this regional consciousness, the mass of the
population becomes easy prey to the appeal of the
basest aspects of the ideologies of the ruling classes in
the metropole (given the social, cultural, communi-
cation and other forms of metropolitan domination of
the area). This destruction of the hegemony of the
ideology of the popular forces was not due to the
invasion but to the imploding of the revolutionary
process. Indeed, one has only to envisage an invasion
in another context (i.e. Bishop alive) to be able to
imagine how different the effects on the position of the
ideas of the popular forces would have been (it is some
measure of this that despite threats, no invasion was
attempted before Bishop's death).
Several bits of evidence can be pointed to in support of
this judgement:
i) The growing acceptance of the notion of political
pluralism referred to earlier has been replaced by a
polarisation of ideologies in the region: pro-colonial
sentiments have risen to the fore and now dominate
the media. Many advocates of pro-colonial views, who
had been silenced by the weight of the prevailing
regional opinion, have emerged emboldened by the
atrocities of the Grenadian left and the public outrage
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against them. Examples include the summary
expulsion from Barbados of Ricky Singh, editor of
Caribbean Contact, easily the most important and
widely circulated publication in the region. Published
by the Caribbean Conference of Churches, it had
condemned the Grenadian executions forthrightly,
but had also convincingly opposed the invasion by the
US and the OECS, exposing in its reportage much of
the disinformation employed by the invaders at the
time. There is also Seaga's call for the exclusion of
Guyana (which had opposed the invasion) from
CARICOM on human rights grounds, while at the
same time suggesting the incorporation of Haiti and
the Dominican Republic into a CARICOM II. We
might also cite the move by the government of St.
Christopher-Nevis, in the aftermath of the invasion, to
give citizenship to 'substantial investors' in that
country, whether or not the persons concerned had
ever lived in or visited the territory!
The 'zone of peace' position, which had gained
considerable acceptance, was replaced by Cold War
exchanges, reinforcing the polarisation of ideological
positions and weakening acceptance of the principle of
political pluralism in the regional system. Thus the
invaders claimed that they had 'eliminated the
Marxist-Leninist axis of conspiracy and violence in the
region'. In turn this provoked calls for the left to 'stop
being naive' and forge close links to the 'presumed
axis' since without these, no progressive, nationalist
development within the region would be possible. The
invaders backed up their statements by moves to
increase their military capabilities substantially under
US guidance, and to use their special connections with
the US government since the invasion openly as a basis
for 'stabilising' the existing order in the region. That
their position was a popular one cannot be denied,
since the wave of snap elections in OECS states in the
wake of the invasion led to the return of the incumbent
administrations with enlarged majorities.'
Instead of the increasing assertion of national
consciousness and opposition to metropolitan domi-
nation, those who presumably hold political power
have reduced the region, and CARICOM in
particular, to a position where the major axis revolves
around the stances taken on the invasion. In some
quarters, e.g. Trinidad-Tobago (which opposed the
invasion and whose government justifiably feels that it
was deceived and manipulated over it), this has bred a
certain 'inwardness' in attitudes at all levels of the
society - a factor which was instrumental in the
demise of the earlier West Indies Federation.
In the case of Jamaica's Seaga, who has strongly identified his
administration with Reagan's ideology, the snap election produced
a 'one-party state'; Michael Manley's PNP boycotted the elections
because known irregularities in the voters' list had not been
attended to, despite the existence of an agreement with the
government that they would be before any elections were held.
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Finally, it is clear that the US has effectively filled
whatever power vacuum had existed in the region.
Despite the propaganda of conservatives, neither
Cuba, nor the Soviet Union, nor any of their alleged
proxies had come anywhere near to filling the power
vacuum which was created by the removal of Britain
as the colonial power. The final seal was put on US
ascendancy at the Commonwealth Heads of Govern-
ment Conference held in India in November 1983,
where the conference communiqué in relation to the
Caribbean declared that 'the emphasis should now be
on reconstruction, not recrimination'. This formulation
clearly put the US action 'above the law', as even
governments opposed to the invasion thus effectively
adjured their responsibility to resist the violation of
international law involved. The emphasis was only on
'repairing the damage'. Such a development would not
have been possible if the invasion had not taken place
in the context of a revolutionary process which had
already destroyed itself.
The Abandonment of Constitutionality
The self-destruction of the revolutionary process in
Grenada also bears directly on the organisation and
future development of popular political formations in
the region. First, the events which led up to the
execution of Maurice Bishop and others clearly
indicate the importance which must be attached to
constitutionality, legality, and due process, in the
legitimation of political action within the region. The
success of the New Jewel Movement and the Maurice
Bishop Government in gathering support to overthrow
the Gairy regime, and subsequently in winning the
support of most West Indians for the Grenadian
revolutionary process, rested largely on their
systematic exposure, when in opposition, of Gairy's
methods of dictatorial rule and his gross violations of
regionally accepted norms of constitutionality,
legality, and due process. Conversely, their own
subsequent failure to hold free and fair elections
tarnished their own reputation in the eyes of large
sections of the popular forces. This was particularly so
because immediately after the successful overthrow of
Gairy, a pledge was made to hold 'free and fair
elections, and elections free from fear', to uphold due
process and to protect the human rights which Gairy
had so grossly violated. The hands of critics were
stayed by fear of splitting ranks in the face of threats of
imminent invasion by the USA, as well as by what
appeared - to sympathetic outsiders at least - to be
serious efforts on the part of the New Jewel Movement
to develop alternative forms of so-called direct
democracy.
The betrayal of trust implicit in the murderous way in
which the political struggles in the New Jewel
Movement finally resolved themselves in October
1983 has been particularly traumatic for those sections
of the popular forces, which in the interest of solidarity
had refrained from open criticism. The immediate
consequence of this (and hopefully it will be an
everlasting one) is that no regime, no matter how
popular it may initially be, will be able to sustain the
support of the popular forces of the region if its
political rule is not grounded in constitutionality,
legality and due legal process. This lesson can be a
lasting gain for the West Indian peoples. The only
regret is that the price paid for learning it should have
been so high.
To oversimplify a complex issue in terms of a general
proposition: after Grenada no social project carried
out in the name of the masses of the Caribbean
peoples, whether by government or opposition, will
receive widespread support from the popular forces
and their organisations if it does not clearly embrace
political democracy as its norm of political conduct.
Whatever difficulties may exist in interpreting this, it
cannot mean less than i) the absence of legal and/or
administrative discrimination on the grounds of race,
religion, tribe, property/income, political party
affiliation, affecting the expression of political opinion
either directly or through elected representatives; ii) no
restrictions apart from age, on the practice of one
person to vote; iii) equality in the legal status of all
political parties, to ensure that contest between
organised political groups is a real contest, representing
real alternatives; iv) the principles of majority rule in
the election of representatives and in the legislative
process - with the proviso that this does not limit the
minority's freedom to become a legal and constitutional
majority; y) due process in the legal system, to ensure
that the above rights are enforceable.
The denial of these rights in Grenada was the more
damaging given certain elements in the region's
history. In the English-speaking Caribbean, the
struggles against slavery, indentured servitude and
colonial bondage had more frequently than not taken
on a legal and constitutional form. Thus the struggle
against servitude was often expressed as a struggle for
the right to personal liberty guaranteed and protected
by law. Similarly the struggles against colonial
bondage and its particular forms of economic
domination were often expressed as a struggle for such
rights as self-determination, one person one vote,
independent trade unionism and so forth. There is
therefore a deeply embedded tradition which views
constitutional and socioeconomic issues as inseparable.
This is not simply the product of 'colonial propaganda
about the virtues of Westminster parliamentarianism',
as some would glibly dismiss it, but reflects a deep
recognition on the part of the popular forces that the
prevailing levels of constitutionality, representative
government, legality, due process and so on are the
product of successful struggles waged both under
colonialism and since independence, not 'gifts' of the
colonial authorities, or of the later post-colonial ones.
Additionally, we might further note that the prevailing
norms of political behaviour directly affect the
institutional forms and organisational procedures of
the popular forces, and so will always bear directly on
their struggles for social advances. To ignore these
truths is to imperil the mass movement in the region,
and thus the long-term project of creating an
egalitarian, democratic and socialist society.
From a more general standpoint, one of the most
commonplace observations made by political scientists
of various persuasions about the independence
settlements after World War ¡Jis that except where
these were preceded by 'wars of national liberation'
which resulted in an effective 'smashing of the colonial
state structures' the transfer of power from coloniser
to colonised was based on the exclusion of the masses,
and in particular working-class organisations, from
state power. Within the Caribbean region the truth of
this observation is seen most clearly in the successful
exclusion of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) from
effective state power in Guyana from 1953 onwards.
In 1953 the PPP was probably the most advanced
working class political organisation in the region, if
not in the British Empire, and bore the distinction of
being the first freely elected Marxist government in
that empire (and indeed in this hemisphere). The
classes to whom the colonising power instead handed
over state power have not unnaturally sought to
perpetuate, through whatever means possible, the
systematic exclusion of the masses from authentic
power.
It is this negation of their democratic rights which
determines much of the popular forces of opposition
to the existing political order. Consequently, any
political process which reproduces this exclusion
cannot enjoy popular respect; and so the naive
vanguardism and 'left-wing' authoritarianism of the
New Jewel Movement prior to Bishop's overthrow
opened the way to a renewed depoliticisation of the
peoples of the region.
Here we had, in effect, a political party of less than 100
members (including candidate members and applicant
members) discussing the future of Grenadian society
(which despite its small size was exceedingly complex)
as if the important decisions to be made were their sole
prerogative. Worse still, regardless of where the
debates took place in the party, effective power lay in
the hands of the 'majority' in the much smaller
political bureau. When the masses intervened against
Bishop's detention and freed him, the same
vanguardism inexorably led this 'majority' to
summarily execute the head of the government, leader
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of the revolutionary process, and commander-in-chief
without any pretence whatsoever of due process. In
retrospect this development might well have been a
foregone conclusion from the moment that Bishop
was put under house arrest on the basis of a 'decision'
of a political bureau acting as if its decisions
automatically became law. Is it any wonder that many
rightly asked: if the party could treat its own in such a
manner, what then was the position of all those who
did not belong to the chosen 100? The savagery and
contempt for life displayed in these actions will live on
and be pointed to time and again in the region as the
particular 'lunacy of the left'. The deserved distrust
which this has generated will for a long time limit the
incorporation of socialist ideology into the struggles
of the popular forces throughout the region.
The Responsibility of the Intellectuals
My third proposition refers to the 'organic intellectuals'
of the Caribbean who contributed so much to
undermining the previous hegemony of colonial and
metropolitian ideas in the region. For them as a group
important lessons can be drawn from the Grenadian
tragedy. Many of these progressive intellectuals, (like
their counterparts in Western Europe and North
America), have been demonstrably uncritical of
political processes initiated in the name of the 'left',
operating as 'cheerleaders' applauding the actions of
those responsible, rather than as constructive and
creative critics. While this is seen as 'giving solidarity',
in reality it indicates an important weakness.
The weakness consists in failing to grasp intellectually
and in practice the distinction between recognising a
process of social development which is objectively
progressive, and giving uncritical political support to
the class or group which is in control of state power at
the time this takes place. Marx faced this issue
squarely when he acknowledged in the fullest manner
the objective progressiveness of the bourgeois class in
breaking the fetters of feudal domination. This did
not, however, lead him to support politically the
project of the bourgeoisie. This he saw as the
substitution of another form of domination, albeit at a
higher level of human achievement. By contrast, in the
Third World and elsewhere we find intellectuals
identifying objective social advances, such as the
spread of political independence, the subsequent
nationalisation of natural resources, and so on, but
then accepting these as sufficient grounds for giving
unquestioning political support to the political groups
controlling state power when these developments are
achieved. Loyalty to the regime in power is substituted
for a constructively critical attitude. In this
substitution, intellectuals as a group negate what is to
my mind their single most important social attribute,
namely capacity for creativity and the exercise of
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independent critical power. One can understand the
temptations which give rise to this attitude: fear of
giving ammunition to the imperialist enemy; the need
to maintain morale among the revolutionary leaders;
the fear of creating doubts about one's own
revolutionary credentials. Succumbing to these
temptations, however, as occurred in the case of
Grenada, does not serve the long-term project of
social transformation and an end to all forms of
exploitation. Those who hold state power sense this
weakness, and it adds to the corruptibility inherent in
all situations where too much power is concentrated in
the hands of too few persons.
In retrospect, events in Grenada show that there is an
urgent need for a serious process of self-criticism
among intellectuals who side with the popular forces.
Many examples of what I refer to can be found in our
failure to respond to major issues generated by the
Grenadian revolutionary process. For instance, did
the geopolitical realities which must be taken into
account by the revolutionary process in a micro-state
located in the strategic back yard of the USA permit
the playing of a leading rhetorical role in the global
ideological struggles between imperialism and
socialism? To what extent does such rhetoric
unnecessarily raise the profile of the micro-state, and
in so doing increase the dangers of directly embroiling
it in the heightened overt and covert hostilities of the
two major military blocs? Does the same consideration
arise when the small state is under conservative
political control, as in the case of Jamaica, where
Seaga plays a leading role in the global ideological
debates between imperialism and socialism? Or is it
simply, as some argue (after Grenada), that there is no
political or national 'space' available to a small state in
the highly polarised international arena of today,
which will allow it to operate independently, when it is
bent on a process of radical transformation? To what
extent must such issues affect the search for consensus
among the popular forces?
Similar fundamental issues not faced by left
intellectuals include the question of what problems are
created when political rhetoric, and strong foreign
policy positions on matters of global significance to
the major powers, outstrip the internal economic
transformation of the country; whether the power
vacuum created by the departure of the British could
have been filled in ways which did not require the
ascendancy of one of the two major military blocs in
the region; or whether the Grenadian experiments
with direct democracy could have constituted an
authentic alternative to representative democracy.
Issues such as these had to be confronted daily during
the existence of the Grenadian revolutionary process.
Yet, apart from the last of them (where in any case
disputes were in whispered tones and the issues were
only raised obliquely) little real debate took place and
little creativity was evidenced. It is therefore not so
surprising that those at the centre of political events so
easily accepted the profoundly anti-democratic theses
advanced during the inter-party disputes which
immediately preceded the tragedy of October 1983.
No one challenged the implicit assumption of the
leading protagonists in the dispute that if the majority
of the party's leadership moved to a 'scientific'
embrace of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the time was
ipso facto ripe for a Leninist or Soviet-type model of
social transformation. The rich regional history of
inner-party struggles, such as those of the People's
National Party of Jamaica, or the PPP of Guyana
during the 1940s and 1950s, was never once referred to
in the course of these developments. instead there was
the arrogance of raising a political theory to a level of a
truth above the wishes of the masses.
Conclusion
It is for these reasons that I have advanced the
argument that the events preceding the invasion of
Grenada, as revealed in the distintegration of the New
Jewel Movement and the imploding of the revolu-
tionary process, have a significance for the popular
forces and left political organisations in the region,
which can hardly be underestimated. Indeed, the
issues raised by these events have a wider significance
than for the Caribbean alone. Wherever people seek to
create a new social order and are not prepared to build
on the achievements of the old, they are bound to
confound their own efforts and produce tragedies such
as those we have witnessed in Grenada.
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